
Its
an old issue with a new twist: how should government safety net funds be allocated
on the basis of need (targeted), or the same for all (entitlement)?
Canadian ministers of agriculture faced this issue a few years ago when Saskatchewan
and Manitoba argued that they should continue to receive a disproportionately
large share of federal safety net funds because of greater need. But in the
absence of any data showing financial risks with farming were any higher, on
average, in those provinces than elsewhere (in fact, results of a federal study
showed this was not so), the federal government chose to allocate its base safety
net funds across provinces in approximate proportion to net farm sales of non
supply-managed commodities. (Saskatchewan and Manitoba do continue to get a
disproportionately larger share of federal safety net funds through other transition/adjustment
programs but the balance is much better than before.) The discussion,
at the time, was not focused on commodity sectoral needs, but rather on provincial
totals.
This decision at the national level has been matched by a steady shift in emphasis,
in federal policy, toward one-size-fits-all safety net programs - with the chief
ones being NISA and disaster assistance - and away from commodity-specific designs.
Ottawa does target safety net dollars to the crop sectors through crop insurance
and interest-free advance payment programs, but the bulk of federal funds go
into NISA and disaster assistance. This has been the federal push ever since
it dropped the national GRIP (Gross Revenue Insurance Program) after the 1994/95
crop year.
This shift in federal policy is one reason why grain and oilseed producers,
who face foreign subsidy competition far greater than that experienced by other
agricultural sectors, have suffered so grievously in recent years.
But now the issue
is coming even closer to home with the Government of Ontario considering how
to implement its new made in Ontario approach to safety net program
design. Will this design target taxpayer money to where it is most needed, or
will it mimic the federal approach?
The equal-money-for-everyone advocates are focusing on NISA. Lets increase
government contributions to NISA for all farmers, they say, so that NISA contributions
represent the dominant usage of public safety net funds. With increased NISA
contributions, there will be money for those who need it, an opportunity to
build up equity for those who dont need the money now but might some time
in the future (perhaps even after retirement), and equal support even for those
sectors whose income fluctuations are reduced by production controls and price
contracts. The rationale is that, by building everyones NISA account up
to a sufficient level, there will be adequate NISA-account reserves when the
crises occur.
This is a distinct
departure from the initial concept of NISA, in which NISA was considered to
be a complement to GRIP and other more targeted support programs.
The argument is also made that by providing the same programs and financial
assistance for every sector, there will be less risk of trade action for those
heavily dependent on exports of farm produce to the United States.
The view supported
by OCPA and other grain and oilseed groups is that, while NISA should function
as originally intended, the bulk of public safety net funds (of which there
are rarely enough) should be most concentrated in areas of need.
Market Revenue Insurance
- Ontarios version of the once national GRIP - is a prime example of targeted
support. It was created specifically to help grain and oilseed farmers survive
and compete in the face of huge U.S. and EU subsidy programs targeted to grain
and oilseed farmers in those countries. That need existed when Market Revenue
Insurance and GRIP were created in 1991, and is just as great today.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture reported in late 2000 that it had tripled
its direct payments to farmers since 1997, with 95% of total U.S. payments going
to grain and oilseed farmers. OECD data on producer subsidy equivalents (a measure
of the percentage of producer income provided by government programs) show the
same pattern. The latest (1999) PSE calculations (a general measure
of the percentage of producer income provided by governments) for Canadian grains
and oilseeds are generally in the range of 10-19% - substantially lower than
for the United States (25-46%). Yet across all Canadian farm commodities, the
imbalance between Canada and the U.S. is not as dominant, an average PSE of
20% for Canada versus 24% in the U.S. PSE values for Europe are far higher in
both cases.
Ontarios safety net approach may also continue to include disaster assistance
even though this program receives frequent criticism, but scarce praise from
any farm sector. The program is also complex and expensive to administer, and
tends to reward single-enterprise farming operations much better than those
with diversification. The approach is a poor substitute for superior programs
designed to address specific problems such as crop insurance and Market Revenue
Insurance. Disaster assistance funds could be better used, at least for crop
farmers, in providing enhanced support for other programs.
If there are adequate
funds for safety net support, no problem exists: lets have a well-funded,
enhanced NISA program for potential future needs, coupled with well-funded,
targeted programs, like crop insurance and enhanced Market Revenue Insurance,
to address current and future specific income needs for crop farmers, along
with disaster assistance for those whom it may benefit.
But what if there is not enough money from government to do it all? What are
the priorities?
There is obvious political appeal in the something-for-everyone, enhanced-NISA approach. But it makes more fiscal sense to concentrate limited dollars on programs which are most effectively targeted to needs. Among those, an enhanced version of Market Revenue Insurance which provides support equivalent to that which exists for competing U.S. growers must rank - along with crop insurance - at the top of the list.
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